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NOTES
DEATH OF THE ABATEMENT DOCTRINE-
MURPHY v. MARTIN OIL CO.
Jack R. Murphy, while having his truck filled with gasoline, was injured
in a fire on the defendant's premises. Nine days later he died from the
resulting injuries. Charryl Murphy, Administratrix of his Estate, filed suit
against James Hocker and Martin Oil Company, the owners of the gas
station. Count I of the complaint alleged a cause of action under the
Illinois Wrongful Death Act.' Count II alleged a cause of action under
the Illinois Survival Act 2 for pain and suffering, medical expenses and
property damage sustained by the decedent before his death.
The -trial court dismissed Count II of the complaint on the ground
that it failed to state a cause of action. The Illinois appellate court af-
firmed the dismissal stating Illinois has traditionally taken the position
that when the injuries to the victim result in death, no damages may be
recovered for his pain and suffering; the remedy in such a case is the
Wrongful Death Act and recovery is limited to pecuniary losses.3 The
court, relying on the so-called abatement rule (also known as the uni-
I. Illinois Wrongful Death Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1973), which pro-
vides in part
[w]henever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect
or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not
ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who or
company or corporation which would have been liable if death had not en-
sued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of
the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under
such circumstances as amount in law to a felony.
2. Illinois Probate Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 339 (1973), which states
[i]n addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the follow-
ing also survive: actions of replevin, actions to recover damages for an in-
jury to the person (except slander and libel), actions to recover damages
for an injury to real or personal property or for the detention or conversion
of personal property, actions against officers for misfeasance, malfeasance,
or nonfeasance of themselves or their deputies, actions for fraud or deceit,
and actions provided in Section 14 Article VI of "An Act relating to alco-
holic liquors," approved January 31, 1934, as amended.
3. Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 4 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 283 N.E.2d 243 (1st Dist.
1972).
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tary death concept)4 acknowledged that a persuasive argument could
be made for overturning this rule,5 but declined -to do so claiming that this
was not the forum for such action.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Wrongful Death
Act is no longer the exclusive remedy available in Illinois when the in-
juries to the victim result in death; those decisions upholding the abate-
ment rule and refusing recovery for conscious pain and suffering were
overruled.6
The court in Murphy completely abandoned the long standing abate-
ment rule and in so doing greatly expanded the remedies available to the
representative of the deceased tort victim. Following a brief explanation
of the nature of survival and wrongful death actions, this Note will exam-
ine the gradual erosion of the abatement rule as it took place in Illinois.
Consideration will be given to the possible significance the final abandon-
ment of this concept will have in Illinois litigation.
The common law did not allow a cause of action for bodily injuries to
survive either the victim or tortfeasor. The cause of action was personal
to the parties and abated with the death of either. 7
Similarly, no cause of action arose when the decedent was killed by the
wrongful act of another. 8 The common law rule denying recovery for
4. If the plaintiff in an action for personal injuries dies before judgment
from some cause other than his injuries the cause of action survives to his
administrator, but if his death results from the injuries sued for, the suit
abates and cannot be further prosecuted.
Pease v. Rockford City Traction Co., 279 Ill. 513, 514, 117 N.E. 83, 84 (1917). This
rule has perhaps more properly been referred to as the unitary death concept, since
technically, the better known meaning of abatement refers to the English common
law rule refusing to allow a cause of action to survive the death of either of the par-
ties. Similarly, some courts refer to this rule as the Holton rule from the case of
its origin, Horton v. Daly, 106 Ill. 131 (1882). For purposes of consistency how-
ever, this rule will be referred to throughout this Note as the abatement rule.
5. Plaintiff argued that the rule of abatement was a product of common law.
This rule is illogical and arbitrary and inasmuch as it no longer fits the needs of
our present system or justice, it should be overiuled. Brief for Plaintiff at 21, 22,
Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 4 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 283 N.E.2d 243 (1st Dist. 1972).
6. Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 Ill. 2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
7. Gemmill v. Smith, 274 Ill. 87, 113 N.E. 27 (1916). 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *302; 3 W. HOLDSwORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 310-36 (3d ed.
1923).
8. Hall v. Gillens, 13 11. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958). It has been suggested
that this rule had its basis in the fact that at common law, most homicides were of-
fenses to the crown and that the death of the victim caused the civil action to merge
with the criminal one. Ross, Foreign Enforcement of Actions For Wrongful Death,
33 MICH. L. REV. 545 (1935); Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29
COLUM. L. REV. 239 (1929).
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wrongful death has been attributed to the English case of Baker v. Bol-
ton 9 Lord Ellenborough stated, without citation of authority, 10 that "[i]n
a civil court the death of a human being could not be complained of as
an injury.""
The rule of Baker v. Bolton persisted in England until 1846 and the
passage of Lord Campbell's Fatal Accidents Act, 12 the first wrongful
death statute and the prototype of most American statutes.'8 This stat-
ute allowed juries to award such damages to the victim's surviving spouse,
parent or child as "they may think proportioned to the Injury resulting
from such Death ... "14
Since Illinois has 'both a Wrongful Death Act and a Survival Act,
much time and judicial expression has been devoted to keeping these
remedies separate and distinct. These statutory remedies are not con-
ceptually identical, each requires different elements of proof and meas-
ures of damages. The Survival Act allows an action for wrongs done -to
the decedent before his death to survive him and recovery includes prop-
erty damages,' medical expenses,' 6 loss of wages up to the time of
death' 7 and damages for conscious pain and suffering.' 8 The Wrongful
Death Act, in comparison, is a remedy for wrongs done to the decedent's
family. The recovery is limited to pecuniary losses (usually measured
9. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
10. It is generally agreed among courts and scholars that Lord Ellenbourough's
famous decision is without authority at common law. Scheilds v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349
(1854); Saunders v. Schultz, 20 Ill. 2d 301, 170 N.E.2d 163 (1960); Rowe v. Rich-
ards, 151 N.W. 101 (S.D. 1915); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
334 (3d ed. 1923); S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 6-7 (1966); Finkel-
stein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures,
Wrongful Death and The Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169 (1973);
Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REV. 431 (1916);
Smedley, Wrongful Death-Basis of Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605
(1960); Winfield, Death As Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 COLUM. L. REV.' 239
(1929).
11. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
12. Act for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents of 1846,
9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
13. Every state now has some provision for awarding damages in a wrongful
death situation. For a comprehensive list of the relevant statutes in each state, see
SPEISER, supra note 10, Appendix A, 773-905.
14. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 art. II. For a general discussion of the common law
and legislation as it affected wrongful death see authorities cited at note 8 supra.
15. Northern Trust Co. v. Palmer, 171111. 383, 49 N.E, 553 (1898).
16. Wetherell v. Chicago City R.R., 104111. App. 357, 361 (1st Dist. 1902).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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in terms of loss of decedent's future earnings) and no damages are al-
lowed for decedent's conscious pain and suffering.' 9
The rule that an action for personal injuries abates when death re-
sults from the injuries sustained was first announced in Illinois in the case
of Holton v. Daly.20 In Holton, the court for the first time was asked
to construe the remedies available under the Survival and Wrongful Death
Acts. The decedent was injured as a result of defendant's negligence .and
subsequently died from those injuries. His administratrix brought suit
under the -then existing Survival Act. 21  The court dismissed the com-
plaint holding that the Survival Act was not meant to embrace injuries
resulting in death since those injuries were already compensible by vir-
tue of the Wrongful Death Act. The court reasoned that since the Wrong-
ful Death Act was passed nineteen years before the Survival Act, the
logical inference was that -the latter was not intended to provide an addi-
tional remedy, but rather to provide a remedy only for those situations not
covered by the former.22 Explaining what it thought was the intent of the
legislature, the court stated "[i].t is not to be presumed it was intended
there should be two causes of action, in distinct and different rights, by
the same party plaintiff, for the same wrongful act, neglect or default." 28
Estimating the difficulty in allocating damages, the court went on to say:
It would, obviously, be impossible to draw a line severing with accuracy
the damages resulting from the permanent character of the injury, and its
effect upon the capacity of the [decedent] for future usefulness ... from
the actual loss to the wife, parent or child, in consequence of being de-
prived of this same capacity, by reason of the same injury resulting in
death.24
Thus, the court, basing its decision on what it thought was the legislators'
intent, created the rule that the Wrongful Death Act is the exclusive rem-
edy available when death results from the injuries complained of.
19. Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101 N.E. 2d 547 (1951).
20. 106111. 131 (1882).
21. § 123 [1871-72] Pub. Laws of Ill. 27th Gen. Assembly 108. This act was
substantially the same as the present Survival Act. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 339,
Historical Note (Smith-Hurd 1961).
22. Prior to the passage of the Survival Act, a representative of an injured tort
victim had no remedy unless the victim died from his injuries. Therefore, the court
reasoned that the Survival Act was meant to embrace only those injuries not cogniz-
able under the Wrongful Death Act. This reasoning has been used by other courts
with different results. In Farrington v. Stoddard, 115 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1940) the
court construed Maine's Survival and Wrongful Death Acts. Here, because the
Survival Act was passed first, the court reasoned that the purpose of the Wrongful
Death Act was to supplement the remedy existing under the Survival Act, and pro-
vide two concurrent remedies where previously only one existed.
23. 106 IMI. at 140.
24. Id.
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This rule was steadfastly followed for many years. 25 In Susemiehl v.
Red River Lumber Co.,26 the Illinois Supreme Court was called upon to
reconsider its position on the construction of the two acts. While ac-
knowledging the fact that other jurisdictions have reached a different con-
clusion, -the court held that the principal of Holton was too well ingrained
in Illinois law; any change would have to come from the legislature.2 T
Faced with the rigidity of the holdings in Holton and Susemiehl, Il-
linois courts, without specifically overruling these cases, began to carve
out exceptions to the abatement rule. For example, in Saunders v.
Schultz, 28 the first departure from rigid Holton rule, the court allowed a
widow, whose husband was killed in an automobile accident, to recover
medical and funeral expenses.
Saunders, if narrowly read however, can be distinguished from Ho-
ton. In Saunders, the plaintiff was not suing under the Survival or Wrong-
ful Death Acts, but rather on behalf of herself for damages she sustained
as a result of being personally liable for medical and funeral expenses
of her spouse under the Married Womens Act.29
The court, after examining similar cases from other jurisdictions, 0
stated, "we find that -there is presently no legally cogent reason for deny-
ing a spouse 'the right to recover for medical or funeral expenses incurred
on behalf of a mate who was wrongfully injured or killed." 3' Rather than
limiting its discussion to the specific issue, the court, although it was not
called on to do so, went on to discuss abatement ;and the Wrongful Death
Act:
[W~e believe that the common law should be construed to permit the re-
covery of [the] funeral and medical expenses in an action either by the de-
cedent's estate, or, as in the instant case where no such claim was made,
by the surviving spouse.8 2
25. Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928); Wilcox v. Int'l Harvester
Co., 278 Il1. 465, 116 N.E. 151 (1917); Mooney v. City of Chicago, 239 I11. 414,
88 N.E. 194 (1909); Chicago & E.I.R.R. v. O'Connor, 119 I11. 586, 9 N.E. 263
(1886).
26. 376 I1. 138, 33 N.E.2d 211 (1941).
27. Id. at 140, 33 N.E.2d at 212.
28. 20 Ill. 2d 301, 170 N.E.2d 163 (1960).
29. Married Womens Act of 1874, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 15 (now the
Husband and Wife Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 15 (1973)).
30. Seymour v. Union News Co., 217 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1954); Follansbee v.
Benzenberg, 122 Cal. App. 2d 466, 265 P.2d 183 (1954); Mattfeld v. Nester, 226
Minn. 106, 32 N.W.2d 291 (1948); McDaniel v. Trent Mills, Inc., 197 N.C. 342,
148 S.E. 440 (1929); Moss v. Hirzel Canning Co., 100 Ohio App. .509, 137 N.E.2d
440 (1955); Hansen v. Hayes, 175 Ore. 358, 154 P.2d 202 (1944).
31. 20 Ill. 2d at 309-10, 170 N.E.2d at 168.
32. Id. at 310, 170 N.E.2d at 168.
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The court went on to say:
The estate or the spouse, either or both as the circumstances indicate,
are entitled to recover for pecuniary losses suffered by either or both
which are not recoverable under the Wrongful Death Act, and all cases
holding the contrary are overruled.33
This seemingly superfluous language provided subsequent courts with
strong dicta, allowing recovery where it had been previously prohibited
under the Holton and Susemiehl rulings.3 4
It was against this background, of what seems to be inconsistent rulings,
that the court in Murphy v. Martin Oil Co.3 5 decided to unequivocally
abandon the abatement rule in Illinois. Noting the absence of legislative
action in remedying the inequities of the Holton rule and acknowledg-
ing the general disapproval of abatement that courts since Saunders have
expressed,3 6 Justice Ward, speaking for the court, saw the need to over-
rule Holton.
Realizing that abandonment of this concept could not be supported by
Illinois case law, the court took the position that the ruling in Holton
was not necessarily correct:
The holding in Holton was not compelled, we judge, by the language or
the nature of the statutes examined.
The remedy available under Holton will often be grievously incomplete.
There may be a substantial loss of earnings, medical expenses, prolonged
pain and suffering, as well as property damage sustained, before an injured
person may succumb to his injuries. To say that there can be recovery
only for his wrongful death is to provide an obviously inadequate justice. 37
The court noted that since Saunders, the holding of Holton was of
questionable authority. Citing the dicta in Saunders previously men-
tioned,38 the court stated, "it has become obvious -that the Wrongful
Death Act is no longer regarded as the exclusive remedy available when
the injuries cause death."'39
33. Id. at 311, 170 N.E.2d at 169.
34. Graul v. Adrian, 32 Ill. 2d 345, 205 N.E.2d 444 (1965), allowing parents
of a child killed by a wrongful act to recover medical and funeral expenses; Chidester
v. Cagwin, 76 Ill. App. 2d 477, 222 N.E.2d 274 (2d Dist. 1966), allowing adminis-
trator who had previously recovered under the Wrongful Death Act to recover in a
common law suit for funeral expenses.
35. 56 Ill'. 2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
36. McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Il1. 2d 487, 216 N.E.2d 140 (1966); Graul v. Adrian,
32 Ill. 2d 345, 205 N.E.2d 444 (1965); Chidester v. Cagwin, 76 Ill. App. 2d 477,
222 N.E.2d 274 (2d Dist. 1966).
37. 56 Ill. 2d at 431, 308 N.E.2d at 586-87.
38. 20 Ill. 2d at 309-10, 170 N.E.2d at 168.
39. 56 Ill. 2d at 428, 308 N.E.2d at 585.
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Unlike Holton, -the court in Murphy saw no great difficul-ty in allocating
damages recoverable under each of ,the statutes:
The usual method of dealing with the two causes of action . . .is to allo-
cate conscious -pain and suffering, expenses and loss of earnings of the
decedent up to the date of death to the survival statute, and to allocate the
loss of benefits -of the survivors to the action for wrongful death. 40
Finally, the court stated:
We consider those decisions which allow an action for fatal injuries as well
as for wrongful death are to be preferred to this court's holding in Holton
v. Daly that the Wrongful Death Act was the only remedy available when
injury resulted in death. 41
Thus the court, realizing no sound reason for adhering to the abatement
rule existed, rejected it.
While the decision in Murphy seems to be a logical approach to the
problem, the court's discussion of this new theory of recovery was less
than thorough. They used the term "conscious pain and suffering" with-
out a full explanation of what it meant.
Where conscious pain and suffering is allowed in a death action, diffi-
culty arises in defining the level of consciousness between the time of in-
jury and the time of death: Does consciousness mean awareness, respon-
siveness or simply awake? Similarly the type. of evidence that will sup-
port an inference of consciousness differs in various jurisdictions.
The court noted the fact that the Federal Employers Liability Act4 2 al-
lows recovery for conscious pain and suffering. 43 This has been in-
terpreted to require a substantial time interval between the injury and
death. 44  However, evidence that the victim merely groaned and raised
his arm has been held sufficient to prove consciousness. 4 5  Still where
40. Id. at 429, 308 N.E.2d at 586, referring to W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 906 (4th ed. 1971).
41. 56 I11. 2d at 430-31, 308 N.E.2d at 586.
42. 45,U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1971).
43. Great Northern Ry. v. Capital Trust Co., 242 U.S. 144 (1916); St. Louis,
Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915); Renaldi v. New York,
New Haven and Hartford R.R., 230 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1956); Wetherbee v. Elgin,
Joliet & Eastern Ry., 191 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1951). Similarly, damages are allowed
for conscious pain and suffering under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1971). Gil-
lespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964); Presley v. Upper Mississippi
Towing Corp., 153 So. 2d 416 (La. App. 1963).
44. "[Sluch pain and suffering as are substantially contemporaneous with death
or mere incidents to it. . .afford no basis for a separate estimation or award of dam-
ages under statutes like that which is controlling here." St. Louis, Iron Mountain
& Southern Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 655 (1914). See also Southern Pacific Ry.
v. Heavingham, 236 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1956).
45, St, Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S, 648, 655 (1914).
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death is instantaneous or fairly contemporaneous with the injury, or
where the victim is completely unconscious during the entire time, re-
covery will be denied. 46 ,
States may also have their own definition of the type of consciousness
that will support a recovery. In Nichols v. Marshall,47 an action under
the Kansas Death Statute, the court indicated that the victim must be
conscious of his pain. 48 There the court found that the victim was suffi-
ciently conscious because the evidence disclosed the victim moved his toe in
response to a direction.4 9 Whatever avenue of approach Illinois takes to the
issue of consciousness, problems will arise for the personal representa-
tives of fatally injured victims -that linger in a semi-conscious state be-
tween the time of the injury and the time of death.
The effect of the Murphy decision on Illinois tort litigation remains to
be seen. Prior to Murphy, the personal representative of a fatally in-
jured tort victim had only one remedy available, the Wrongful Death Act.
Damages under this Act, because they are limited to the pecuniary loss
of the beneficiaries, could be calculated with some mathematical con-
sistency.8 0
Damages for pain and suffering, however, because they depend on no
precise mathematical formula, but on a subjective determination by the
jury, can often be arbitrary.51 Juries' emotions are likely -to be height-
ened when the victim's injuries result in death and further when the de-
ceased victim leaves a dependent wife or children. In the highly emo-
tional setting of a wrongful death trial, it is quite possible for a jury to ex-
46. New Orleans & Northeastern R.R. v. Harris, 247 U.S. 367 (1918); Norfolk
& Western Ry. v. Holbrook, 235 U.S. 625 (1915); Moffett v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
220 F. 39 (4th Cir. 1914). For a discussion of conscious pain and suffering as it
relates to federal statutes, see Annot., 13 L. Ed. 2d 1013 (1964).
47. 486 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1973).
48. "There is no question that pain and suffering must be realized by the injured
before it is compensible.... ".Id. at 793. But see Civil v. Waterman Steamship
Corp., 217 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1954) where the court found conscious pain and suffer-
ing even though the victim was paralyzed and incapable of feeling any sensation.
49. See. also Nimnicht v. Ostertag, 225 So. 2d 459 (Fla. App. 1969) where the
victim was unconscious or semiconscious during the entire period but periodically
squeezed another's hand, and recovery was allowed. Tri-State Poultry Cooperative,.
Inc. v. Carey, 190 Md. 116, 57 A.2d 812 (1948) where the victim, though not totally
conscious and not responsive to questions, moaned and groaned several times. This
was held to be sufficiently conscious to support recovery.
50. For a discussion of the various elements of damage for wrongful death in Illi-
nois, see Radley, The Value of a Breadwinner, 59 ILL. B.J. 574 (1971). See also
S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH §§ 3, 4, 9 (1966); S. SPEISER, REcov-
ERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH-ECONOMIC HANDBOOK (1970).
51, Lau v. West Towns Bus Co., 16 Ill. 2d 442, 158 N.E.2d 63 (1959).
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aggerate the damages for pain and suffering. Unless these damages are so
excessive as to indicate passion and prejudice on the part of the jury, they
will not be overturned on review.52
In other jurisdictions, where recovery for pain and suffering is allowed
in wrongful death actions, substantial amounts have been recovered. For
example, in Florida East Coast Ry. v. Stewart53 the court upheld an
award of $300,000, $100,000 of which was for pain and suffering, even
though the victim lived only nine days following the accident.
Similarly, in Toczko v. Armentano,54 the Massachusetts Supreme
Court allowed recovery of $7,500 for pain and suffering to stand, not-
withstanding the fact that the victim lived for less than two hours after
the accident. It is not difficult to foresee similar awards forthcoming in
Illinois. 55
Finally, because the decision of the court in Murphy represents a posi-
tion new to Illinois tort law, many questions remain unanswered. In ad-
dition to the question of consciousness already discussed, questions as
to type of evidence necessary to prove conscious pain and suffering,
whether mental suffering alone will support a verdict and what damages
are excessive, can only be answered by subsequent litigation. Unsuc-
cessful defendants, faced with the prospect of paying large awards for
pain and suffering, will no doubt be willing to test each of these questions
in the courts of review.
Salvatore R. Marzullo
52. Greim v. Sharpe Motor Lines, 101 111. App. 2d 142, 242 N.E.2d 282 (3d
Dist. 1968).
53. 140 So. 2d 880 (Fla. App. 1962).
54. 341 Mass. 474, 170 N.E.2d 703 (1960).
55. See also Nichols v. Marshall, 486 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1973), where the court
upheld an award of $78,095 for pain and suffering since decedent lived for nine days
following the accident. But see Illinois Central R.R. v. Nelson, 245 Miss. 395, 146
So. 2d 69 (1962), where the court held $150,000 for pain and suffering excessive
even though decedent sustained severe first degree burns and lingered for fourteen
days in great pain.
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